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This paper examines the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing and its impact on United
States foreign counter-terrorism policy. This research was conducted first by establishing
a baseline as to what was U.S. counter-terrorism policy from the years of 1976-1981, and
then looking into what changes occurred following immediately after the 1983 bombing.
What was found was that there was a recommendation for a change of policy towards a
more proactive approach to counter-terrorism. Then through looking at how the idea of a
proactive policy shaped the new laws and bills, and reactions to terrorist incidents during
the Reagan administration. This showed that the idea of a proactive policy was in fact
adopted. Then to see ifthere was an impact ofthis policy change years later in U.S.
policy research was conducted into the counter-terrorism policies of President Clinton.
What was discovered was that when faced with the threat of terrorism, President Clinton

responded by using counter-terrorism policies that modeled along the same lines as the
proactive policy adopted under President Reagan.

Introduction

, It was October 23, 1983 in Beirut, Lebanon. Marines stationed at the Beirut
International Airport (BIA) remember that day as being a "a typical Beirut morning, the
sunrise bright and beautiful".

At 6:22 A.M. a yellow Mercedes truck barreled through the

protective chain-link fence ofthe compound. For those Marines that were stationed on
early morning duty, they were stunned at first for what occurred. This very truck was
similar to the ones that employees at the BIA used to transport goods, although this one
was different, for it had broken through an important protective barrier for the Marine
barracks stationed there. This very act at alone would startle anyone. After coming back
to their senses from this unusual occurrence, the Marines stationed on duty notice the
driver. The driver was a man "swarthy bearded man ...dressed in a dark blue or green
shirt." After registering the driver in their minds eye the Marines raised their M-16 rifles
to fire, but before they get a chance to fire the truck and the driver had already made it past
their position and farther into the camp were Marines were sleeping. With the truck
speeding into the camp, unaware of what its intentions, were but only that they were not
good, some of the soldiers being to run away from the vehicle and in the process warn their
fellow men of the impending crisis. One such man, a Sergeant Russell, noticed the yellow
Mercedes speeding right at him and he turned and ran into the very building that the driver
was headed towards. While he was running Russell was yelling at the top of his lungs to
anyone he passed saying such things in the heat of the moment as, "Get the fuck outa
here!" As he made it to the Marine's barracks at the BIA, Russell yells to everyone and
yet no specific person to "HIT THE DECK!" a total of three times. As Russell continued

forward warning his fellow Marines he made it through the barracks, and noticed another
Marine and yelled to him to get down. The time is 6:22 A.M. and eighteen seconds. As
Russell looked back and noticed that the truck has stopped, he noticed that the driver is not
moving and wonders if he may be injured. The next thing that Russell saw was "a bright
orange-yellow flash at the grill ofthe truck" and he felt "a wave of intense heat."l
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Eric M. Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982-February 1984 (San

Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,

1985),287-295.
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Figure 1. Photograph of the October 1983 bombing of
Marine barracks in Beirut,
Lebanon. Taken during the bombing by a civilian and later collected by the United States
Marine Corps for documentation. Accessed from the United States Marine Corps.
The yellow Mercedes truck had about 12,000 pounds of high explosives wrapped in
canisters of flammable gases. At the time of this incident it was said that this explosion
3

had been the largest nonnuclear blast ever detonated on the face of the earth. The blast
alone sent out a shockwave, causing the collapse of the barracks. The initial blast caused
the four-story building to be lifted up into the air. Then the building fell in upon itself.
Following this due to the explosives wrapped in canisters of flammable gases, a large ball
of flaming gas was hurled in every direction. Also a shockwave created from the
explosion damaged surrounding buildings. (look to the appendix to figure 2, to see a
layout of the building) Sergeant Russell, the only man to have seen the blast itself was
hurled fifteen to twenty feet. Russell came away from the blast with a twisted leg, a
laceration to the head, and a large portion of his skin blown off. Ultimately though he did
survive. The blast itself created a crater that measured thirty-nine feet by twenty-nine feet,
and was eight feet eight inches in depth. As stated in The Root by Eric Hammel, at the
time this was considered to be the largest nonnuclear blast ever detonated?

On October 23, 1983 in Beirut, Lebanon 241 United States military personnel(-220
Marines and 21 Navy medical personnel-)were either killed or mortally wounded by the
initial explosion, the collapse of the building, or the flaming gas. These Marines and
sailors were on a peacekeeping mission to Lebanon, whose goals were: 1) to facilitate the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, 2) to protect a sovereign, independent
Lebanon, and 3) to secure. a southern border with Israel. These Marines and Navy medics
were killed by terrorist from the Islamic Jihad Organization, a group associated with

2

Hammel, The Root, 303 and David C. Willis, The First War on Terrorism: Counter-

Terrorism Policy During the Reagan Administration (Lanham, Md: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2003), 62.
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•

Hezbollah, which hoped to remove Israeli, U.S., and other foreign influences in the
country and set up a Muslim dominated.3

This paper examines the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing and its impact on United
States foreign counter-terrorism policy. Many historians and scholars have written
abundantly on the recent United States war on terrorism yet relatively little has been
written on the United States war on terrorism, from 1981 to 1989, and the ever evolving
U.S. foreign counter-terrorism policy. What was the impact of the 1983 Beirut barracks
bombing on United States foreign counter-terrorism policy? Analyzing the impact of
major terrorist events on U.S. policy should contribute significantly to the larger debate on
the United States ongoing battle against terrorism. My investigation of United States
government documents and writings on the Beirut bombing suggest that there a change in
US. foreign counter-terrorism policy through the use of the Long Commission and the
National Security Decision Directive 138. Following the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing,
United States policy did change to a proactive policy but it wasn't implemented for years
due to the non-active role that the president, internal problems in the Reagan
administration, through the problems and disagreements of Reagan's Secretary of State
and Defense Secretary on policies. It wasn't until the final years of the Reagan
administration that an impact could be seen in U.S. policy in that the implementation of
said policy was finally accomplished when President Reagan took an active role in
counter-terrorism policy. This change in U.S. policy to a more proactive policy helped

3

Willis, The First War, 49 and 62-63.
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shape the policies under President Clinton, whose policies followed a similar course of
action.

Terrorism is not a new trend or a phenomenon.

It is a concept that has been in

existence since Biblical times, even documented within the Christian Bible. At the same
time it has become an important topic in today's studies because of the September 11,
2001 World Trade Center terrorist attack. As such there has been a renewed interest in
terrorism due to the World Trade Center terrorist attack, although 9111 has become the
focus point of scholarly research on terrorism, yet there was still large amounts ofterrorist
attacks against the United States prior to the September 11,2001 attacks. That is why it is
important to analyze the impact of terrorist events and see their specific contributions to
U.S. policy so as to analysis the effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness of U.S. policy over
the years.

Historiography and Sources

The historiography available on this subject may be divided into three related
aspects of the topic: works that take a broad look into counter-terrorism and the changes in
United State's policy, those that focus on United States and it's battle against terrorism,
and President Reagan's actions against terrorism. There are a number of works that
address critically the effects of terrorism on the United States from 1975-2000, and how it
6

specifically affected U.S. policy. Of these many great monographs, only a select few can
be reviewed here. Robert Kumamoto's International Terrorism & American Foreign

Relations 1945-1976, reflects the ideas of the influence of terrorism on U.S. policy within
an older paradigm. He stresses that during this time period that terrorist and the idea of a
"freedom fighter" were often but not always synonymous with one another for the United
States, but it did depend on the side to which the terrorist was allied with. As such the
United States tended to side with the "freedom fighter" or took a specific stance of
neutrality. Either way he focuses more on the issue of the concept that the U.S policy itself
was shaped around the international law of the time, and as such the United States policy
was ill defined because it was not a major concern to the United States. Other historians
like David Willis and Lawrence Freedman contend that terrorism was not a major concern
to the United States because terrorism was only directed towards American business and
not the citizens. They then state that kidnappings and other such activities became a
popular form of terrorism because of the large increase of Americans abroad in other
nations.4

In addressing the United States and it's many and varied battle on terrorism there
seems to be a large collection of these works. Although at the same time these works
either focus on terrorism as being a form of freedom fighting for better rights, trying to

4

Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle-East

(New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Robert Kumamoto, International Terrorism &

American Foreign Relations 1945-1976 (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
1999); Willis, The First War.
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elude to the American Revolution, focus on state-sponsored terrorism, or as independent
networks of terrorist cells that came out ofthe Cold War. There are few works on the
elusion that terrorism is a form of freedom fighting and that the United States aided these
groups because the works on State-Sponsored Terrorism have been the norm for the
longest of time when dealing with terrorism during the Cold War. Works by Mahmood
Mamdani, Steven L. Spiegel, and Samir Khalaf focus on the idea that the because the
United States and the Soviet Union were grasped in a power battle that neither could either
push forward individually.

As such the sponsoring of terrorism, specifically by the Soviet

Union, became a popular mode of attacking each other's interest in the eternal power
struggle that occurred during the Cold War. In Patrick Tyler's work A World of Trouble:

The White House and the Middle East-from the Cold War to the War on Terror he
contends that because the Cold War was over state-sponsorship stopped becoming the
norm. Tyler does say that there were still sponsors of terrorism but they became far and
few between, due to the increase in international law against the act. Instead he points to
the privatization of terrorism through independent financial ventures and financiers that
independently run terrorist cells became the norm. He contends that this actually made it
harder for the U.S. to deal with because they were not associated with one state and as such
became harder to fight. 5

5

Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the

Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004); Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil
Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Steven L Spiegel, The Other ArabIsraeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan
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President Ronald Reagan's administration has been written about abundantly but
comparatively there has been little work done on Reagan's specific actions against
terrorism, relatively compared to the history of the United States and terrorism. Although
within the work that has been written there is a general consensus that Reagan took little
action against terrorism but the policies that he did enact were very important in combating
terrorism. There is two schools of thought when written about terrorism during the Reagan
administration:

you are either critical of what he did/didn't do or you write in favor of

what Reagan did during his administration and praise him. Martin and Walcott's work is a
prime example of being critical of the lack of actions that Reagan took to diffuse and
combat terrorism. They repeatedly state that Reagan took little to no action and merely put
forth policy, which was never fully enforced or stressed. Comparatively Marc A. Celmer's
work focuses on the idea that Reagan did take appropriate action and that the policies he
did enact were instrumental, but the fault of effectively combating terrorism did not work
to the greatest effect due to such agencies as the CIA; but nonetheless Reagan did take
appropriate action against the continuous threat of terrorism.

6

University of Chicago Press, 1985); Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble: The
White House and the Middle East-from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York:

(Chicago:

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010); Alan Axelrod, Political History of America's Wars
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007).
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Marc A Celmer, Terrorism, Us. Strategy, and Reagan Policies (New York:

Greenwood Press, 1987); David C Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The

Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1988); Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: Us. Guerrilla
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Although President Reagan's tenure as President ofthe United States ended over
twenty years ago, his documents and papers from his administration have yet to be
declassified so I am without key primary documents from his administration that could
deal with terrorism and his policies. As such then to establish the specific policies that
where in effect during the Reagan administration I will use a number of prominent
documents with some of the most notable and comprehensive of these coming from the
United States Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Department of State.
Also I will use the writings of Ronald Reagan and the National Security Decision
Directives (NSDD) to show an understanding of the time of the 1983 Beirut Bombing and
its immediate impact. For example, the Department of State makes many extensive
references to terrorism; it's effects on the areas of the world, and certain suggestions to
counter the progression of terrorism and the militants behind the attacks. Only through a
thorough investigation of all of these collections can it be shown the impact of the 1983
Beirut bombing on U.S. counter-terrorism policy.

7

Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter Terrorism, 1940-1990 (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1992).
7

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism 2 vols. (Washington, DC:

1977-1979); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center,

Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980 (Washington, DC: June 1981); U.S.
Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 7 vols. (Washington, DC: 19882001); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Significant Incidents
of Political Violence Against Americans 5 vols. (Washington DC: 1994-1998); U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Political Violence Against
Americans, 1998 (Washington DC: 1999); Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed.
Douglas Brinley (New York: Harper Collins, 2007); Ronald Reagan, Ed. By Ralph E.
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In order to better understand the change in policy resulting from the 1983 Beirut
bombing, I will first examine what policy was before the incident, especially in the 1970s
and early in the Reagan administration. Within the following text of my paper I will use
chronology to establish the paper. As such I will note the specific policies from 19761981, the policies during the Carter administration, so as to establish a baseline of U.S.
policy. Then I will note how the 1983 Beirut bombing affected the Reagan policies.
Finally to note what/any the long-term effects of the 1983 Beirut bombing on United States
policy, one has to research farther into the future. To accomplish this I will discuss the
policies after the Reagan administration, 1989-2000. This is based off of the premise that
U.S. policy is always evolving and changing, yet it has to evolve off of specific existing
policies. By looking at the impact either short or long-term one can ascertain the
importance of such a topic as the impact of the 1983 Beirut bombing and see possibilities
for it's greater importance in the study of the evolution of U.S. policies, specifically
counter-terrorism policy.

us. Counter-Terrorism Policy, 1976-1981

Weber, Ralph A. Weber, Dear Americans: Letters from the Desk of President (New
York: Doubleday, 2003); U.S. National Security Council, NSDD 30: Managing

Terrorism Incidents (April 10, 1982); U.S. National Security Council, NSDD 138:
Combatting Terrorism (April 33,1984); U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 1989 (Washington, DC: April 1990), iii.
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During this time terrorist incidents were dramatically different then they were after
200l. In 1976 the Central Intelligence Agency noted some specific trends: 1) the
hijacking of commercial aircraft had experience a modest revival, 2) incidents ofterrorism
were on the rise, and 3) burden born by U.S. commercial facilities and their employees
. abroad increased markedly. Although there were the traditional actions of terrorism
(bombings, armed assaults, assassinations, and incendiary attack), terrorists were not
interested in these actions. Terrorists were more concentrated on United States business
and their employees abroad. This is because despite a "no concessions" policy by the
government U.S. business decided to cooperate with terrorist demands. U.S. business
would pay offthe terrorist demands, which usually were about a ransom for a specific
employee. At the same time terrorists also targeted U.S. owned business abroad which
said business would give into the demand of the terrorist or the business would hire private
antiterrorist paramilitary squads to deal with the terrorists and their demands. As shown by
Figure 3, the largest attacks against the US by terrorists in 1976 were against US business
facilities or commercial aircraft. Using data from 1976 is a good indicator of not only the
type ofterrorist attacks against the US during the 1976 to 1981 period that this section is
highlighting but it also is a good indicator of the type of terrorist attacks prior to 1976. It
was more economical for terrorist organizations to target US business because the business
were willing to go against US policy and payoff the terrorists.

8
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U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism in 1976, (Washington,

July 1977),4-17
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DC:

Number of Incidents

Target
US officials (civilian or military) or their
property

7

US installations or property

15

US businessmen

3

US business facilities or commercial aircraft

21

Foreign employees of US firms

12

US private citizens

3

Total

61

Table 1. International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property in 1976, by Category of
Target. Data retrieved from International Terrorism in 1976, Washington, DC: July 1977.

As previously noted business had hired antiterrorist paramilitary squads to deal
with their terrorist problems. As such these antiterrorist mercenaries had actually deterred
terrorists from holding hostages for extended period of time. Although the US policy of
"no concessions" with terrorists still was in existence. To combat airplane hijackings by
terrorists, which had actually been on the rise, greater regional cooperation among nations
was called for. The greatest of these cooperation's came form the Bonn Economic Summit
Conference in July of 1978. It was here that the seven participants (Canada, Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) "agreed to

13

cut off air commerce with nations refusing to extradite or prosecute hijackers and/or to
return hijacked plans.?"

On November 4, 1979 fifty-two US citizens were held hostage in Tehran, Iran
resulting in probably the most notable hostage crisis recent memory occurred for the
United States. Out ofthis hostage situation came various resolutions to discuss terrorism.
In November of 1980 the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) parliamentary
assembly adopted a resolution on terrorism. Within this document greater cooperation as
well as information sharing was urged upon member nations. Also it sought cooperation
on joint measures against subversive groups that may be responsible for terrorism or
providing financial support to international terrorists. The other notable document that
came from the Iran hostage crisis was the adoption of the Declaration on Terrorism and the
US Hostages in Iran in December of 1980 by fifteen NATO foreign ministers. Here the
declaration condemned terrorist acts, as well as calling for intergovernmental cooperation.
Other similar, but less notable declarations emerged from the Iran hostage crisis, but they
all had the same message: the condemnation ofterrorism and acts perpetrated by terrorists
as well as greater cooperation among governments of the world.

10

During the period from 1976 to 1981 the institution of antiterrorism expanded
within the United States government. There were eleven additional agencies and
9

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism in 1978 ,(Washington,

DC: March 1979),2-5.
10

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Patterns of

International Terrorism: 1980, (Washington, DC: June 1981), 13-17.
14

departments created, as well as the restructuring of the command structure and the
establishment of Delta Force, an elite special forces unit that primarily deals with counterterrorism. However during this period there were notable policy weaknesses.

Although

President Carter did his best to address these, the incident of the Iran hostage crisis as well
as the failure of Operation Eagle Claw brought into question the effectiveness and the
capabilities of U.S. counter-terrorism policies, and the dramatically changing nature of
world politics and crisis, as other issues besides the Cold War became increasingly
important.

II

At the conclusion of the Carter administration and on the cusp of the Reagan
administration there were specific guidelines established by the United States in reaction to
terrorism, as compiled by the Executive Committee on Terrorism, which was established
by the National Security Council in 1979:

• We condemn all terrorist actions as criminal, whatever their
motivation;
• We take all lawful measure to prevent terrorist acts and we
will not accede to
• Terrorist blackmail because to grant concession only invites
further demands;
• We look to the host government when American are
abducted overseas to exercise its responsibilities under
international law to protect all person within its territories,
and to insure the safe release of hostages;
• We maintain close and continuous contact with the host
government during terrorist operations, supporting the host
II

Celmer, Terrorism, Us. Strategy, and Reagan Policies, 113.
15

government with practical intelligence and technical
services;
• We understand the extreme difficulty of the decisions
governments are often called upon to make during terrorist
operations; and
• International cooperation to combat terrorism is important.
We intend to pursue all avenues to strengthen such
.
12
cooperation.

As you can see there were very clear weakness within the U.S. policy when dealing
with terrorism. The only clear items established were that terrorism was a crime, the
United States would not tolerate it, and that the U.S. would cooperate with other
governments to combat terrorism. There was a need for change, and change would be met
on the very first day that the next president, Ronald Reagan, assumed the highest office in
the United States.

Counter-Terrorism Policy under the Reagan Administration, 1981-1989

Proceeding after his commencement as the President ofthe United States, Ronald
Reagan devoted a portion of his inaugural address to specifically discuss the issue of
terrorism. His address specifically said, "[terrorism] is a weapon that we as American do
have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and prey upon their
12

Kumamoto, International

Terrorism, 199-200.
16
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The reason that Reagan discussed terrorism during his inaugural address was

because a major reason that he had been elected; as president was because of the way that
President Carter had handled the Iranian hostage crisis. Specifically during his campaign,
Reagan had made promise to direct large amounts of resources if he was elected to
combating terrorism. On the sixth day of his administration, January 26, 1981, Ronald
Reagan had a meeting. In his own personal journal President Reagan noted that he had, "a
meeting on terrorism with heads ofF.B.I.-S.S.-C.I.A.
ordered they be given back their ability to function."

Sec's of St., Defense & others. Have
14

Effectively Ronald Reagan felt that

the most effective manner of combating terrorism was by giving control back to each
respective department.

From this action one can see the importance that Reagan had

placed on the issue of combating terrorism abroad. By giving control of combating
terrorism back to each individualized agency Reagan gave them great autonomy instead of
a central command structure, which is contrary to today's combat against terrorism were
the Homeland Security Act created by President George W. Bush is the central command
structure.

As the focus of this paper the United States became involved with sending U.S.
forces as members of the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF). These soldiers had the
mission as peacekeepers to oversee the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). This was because in 1975 a civil war erupted throughout all of
13

Willis , 2

Ronald Reagan,
Collins, 2007), 1.
14

The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley,

17

(New York: Harper

Lebanon, and in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon to specifically target the PLO that was
within the Lebanese's border. To ease the tensions that had erupted in Lebanon over the
invasion by Israel, in 1982 the MNF was created.

As previously stated, the Islamic Jihad Organization targeted and bombed the
Beirut Barracks in October of 1983. The Islamic Jihad Organization did so with the clear
goal in mind of causing the removal of the foreign soldiers, even peacekeepers, from
Lebanon. The Islamic Jihad Organization's goal was accomplished because on February 2,
1984 the Marines were ordered to begin to withdraw from Lebanon by President Reagan,
and the withdrawal was completed by February 26th.

Following the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing; the Department of Defense (DoD)
conducted an independent inquiry into the bombing that would come to be known as the
Long Commission Report. The DoD's focus was on the security of the United States
forces within the MNF, as well as looking into and assessing the terrorist incident. This
commission was composed of Admiral Robert L. 1. Long, USN (Ret), Chairman; the
Honorable Robert 1. Murray; Lieutenant General Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC (Ret),
Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr, USAF, (Ret), and Lieutenant General Joseph T.
Palastra, Jr, USA.

15

The report concluded on December 20, 1983 that terrorism wagainst military
personnel and facilities was becoming more frequent and that there was a growing lethality

Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act,
October 23, 1983 (United States Government Printing Office: December 20, 1983),2.
IS

18

in terrorist incidents. The DoD report recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a broad range of appropriate military responses to
terrorism, as well as political and diplomatic actions be created.

16

This idea came from the

concept that:
Combating terrorism requires an active policy. A reactive policy only
forfeits the initiative to the terrorists. The Commission recognizes that
there is no single solution. The terrorist problem must be countered
politically and militarily at all levels of government. Political initiatives
should be directed at collecting and sharing intelligence on terrorist
groups, and promptly challenging the behavior of those states which
employ terrorism to their own ends. It makes little sense to learn thata
State or its surrogate is conducting a terrorist campaign or planning a
terrorist attack and not confront that government with political or military
consequences if it continues. 17.

As noted from the DoD report the United States needed to change its policy. It
notes that the United States had a reactionary policy when dealing with terrorist incidents.
The U.S.'s typical policy prior to 1983 was to deal with a terrorist incident after it had
occurred. Instead the Commission was reporting that the United States needed to shift
away form this policy. They recommended that the U.S. adopt a proactive policy.
Reactionary policy was based on the idea of defense against a terrorist attack through the
use of military force. Instead a proactive policy was meant to be a preemptive offensive
policy. In the case of using the term "offense", this policy was not solely directed at using
large amounts of military force combat terrorism as well as preemptively strike against

16

Report of the DOD Commission, 124, 129.

17

Report of the DOD Commission, 128.
19

terrorist attacks through a show of force. Instead proactive policy meant the use of the
military, intelligence agencies, diplomacy, and forces as a measure of self-defense.

18

Following the DoD's Commission report, on April 26m 1984 the White House
sent to Congress National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD 138). "It signaled the
Reagan administration's

desire to deter and prevent terrorism."

19

Specifically NSDD 138

stated, "perpetrators ofterrorist acts are brought to justice" and for "anti-terrorism training
and in some cases equipment, to foreign governments."

Also so too came the urging from

President Regan that Congress pass: The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime and Hostage-Taking which extended the "Federal jurisdiction over any kidnapping
in which a threat is made to kill, injure, or continue to detain a victim in order to compel a
third party to do or to abstain from doing something". Also the Aircraft Sabotage Act,
which Reagan hoped Congress would pass to cover the unlawful seizure of aircraft, covers
certain offenses or acts committed aboard an aircraft, and establishing jurisdiction over
certain offenses affecting the safety over civil aviation. The last act determining
jurisdiction of certain offenses hadn't in 1982 been ratified and Reagan was urging
Congress to pass the legislation to satisfy the United States obligation under international
law. The Final two provision urged by President Reagan under NSDD 138 were: the Act
for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts which created a reward system to

18

Beyond the Iran-Contra

Post-Reagan

Anti-Terrorism

Policy in the

Era, ed. Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington,

Massachusetts:
19

Crisis: The Shape o/US.

Lexington Books, 1988), 6.

Celmer, 63.
20

pay for information regarding terrorist acts either in the United States or against the
United States abroad. Finally, the Prohibition Against the Training or Support of
Terrorist Organization Act of 1984. Within this bill the Department of Justice was given
greater ability to prosecute persons involved in supporting a group and states engaged in
terrorism. It also prohibited individuals and groups from supporting or cooperating by
helping recruit, solicit, or to train people to engage in terrorist activities.i"

With the Long Commission's report already establishing the need for a shift in
policy, NSDD 138 shows that the change that was called for was being followed. The
Long Commission Report called for a greater use of the resources at the disposal of the
United States. As such NSDD 138 started to show this trend of being more proactive.
With the inclusion ofthe Justice Department, the creation of a reward system for money,
and others NSDD 138 shows that following the 1983 Beirut bombing, U.S. foreign
counter-terrorism policy had changed and was still changing to effectively combat the
threat that was state-sponsored terrorism within the 1980' s.

Following along the chronology of the Reagan Administration, there are also a
number of items that showcase the impact that the 1983 Beirut bombing had. In 1984
came the creation of the Act to Combat International Terrorism. This act was highlighted
in NSDD 138, but only came into fruition later that year by crating a program of rewards
for information leading to the arrest and conviction of terrorists. In 1985, in the hope of

U.S. National Security Council. NSDD 138: Combatting Terrorism, April 33,1984,
1-5.
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improving security at U.S. diplomatic posts around the world Congress approved of a
$110 million dollar bill to fund the project. Also in 1985 came the creation of the Foreign
Assistance Authorization Act. This act expanded the jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation
Administration to inspect airports outside of the United States and established a procedure
for issuing travel advisories for airports that fail to meet the minimum-security standards.
In 1986 came the creation of the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act. Among the most notable
parts of this bill was that murder or assault against an American overseas would be
considered a United States crime. It also prohibited Americans form providing training or
other services to foreign authorities that would aid and abet international terrorism. As for
in n1983 the United States created the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (AAP). This
was created as a bilateral agreement since the United States was moving away from
multilateral agreements due to the desire of constructing a framework of multi state
bilateral cooperation.

The AAP during the Reagan administration trained over 1,500

civilian officials from thirty-two U.S. friendly foreign governments in the first two years
of its existence.r'

Though following the initial meeting that President had on his sixth day in office,
terrorism was an important to President Reagan. He felt that by giving autonomy and
greater control back to the governmental department, he would not suffer the blunders that
President Carter had faced by being the controlling figure in his counter-terrorism policy,
Reagan though suffered form similar problems as President Carter.

21

Celmer, 106 and Beyond Iran-Contra Affair, 6
22

During the Reagan Administration there was continual progress on United States'
foreign counter-terrorism policy, but there were problems with implementation of these
policies. When Reagan decentralized the issue of terrorism, he neglected to establish a
structure of hierarchy. Though the idea of giving greater control to each government
agencies was a good idea based off of President Carter's way of control U.S. counterterrorism policy, but there was a problem for Reagan. Reagan's approach left him out of
the loop when it came to knowing and implementing U.S. counter-terrorism policy. At the
same time with the executive branch not at the epicenter of the hierarchical structure, there
was a vacuum of power that needed to be filled. This vacuum was to be fought over by
Reagan's Secretary of State George Shultz and his Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.

These two men, George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, had conflicting ideologies
when it came towards counter-terrorism policy. These conflicting ideologies are best
exhibited in their reactions toward the 1983 Beirut bombing. Following the initial attack
in Beirut, Shultz felt that the appropriate response was a retaliatory strike against targets in
Lebanon. Weinberger on the other hand believed that the United States should not attack
anyone in retaliation for the bombing in Beirut, and his plan to not retaliate was chosen as
the mission plan to follow the Beirut barrack bombing. Secretary of State George Shultz
later felt that, "our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of
active prevention, preemption and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter
future terrorist acts.,,22 Both Shultz and Weinberger would exert influence whenever they
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could in the realm of counter-terrorism policy. Both of these men felt that their respective
opinions and ideologies were the better one with either side still vying for control within
the vacuum that Reagan had created.r'

Though continually throughout his presidency Ronal Reagan's counter-terrorism
policies continued to evolve and grow more complex, they still had the issue of effective
implementation.

Though this problem can be partially attributed to Shultz and

Weinberger, as already stated the real blame also lies on the laurels of President Reagan.
Though Reagan had made terrorism a major issue during his campaign for the presidency
in the 1980 election, and effectively the start of his presidency. Though terrorism started
off as a key issue over the years, based on the evidence of not being involved within the
meeting and policy planning session for counter-terrorism, President Reagan had kept
himself out ofthe counter-terrorism loop. Statistically speaking this could be because
form 1980 until 1982 the number of terrorist attack were low, but between 1982 until 1986
there was a large spike in terrorist incidents. (See Table 2) Based on this evidence it
would seem that when terrorism became a prevalent and noteworthy issue, the president
became involved and accountable.
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Year

Number of Incidents

1982

477

1983

485

1984

598

1985

782

1986

774

Total

3,116

Table 2. Number of International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-1986. Data retrieved from
U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986. Washington, DC:
January 1988.

Such incidents that were notable that caused the president to become active within
terrorism policy was a car bombing that took place in Beirut in 1985. Also in 1985 there
was the hijacking ofthe Achille Lauro ship. Finally, there was the bombing of the Trans
World Airlines Flight 840 during its flight to Athens, Greece. While over Argos, Greece
the bomb was detonated which resulted in the death of 4 American and the injury of
countless others. These incidents marked the rise in terrorist attacks and couple with the
Iran-Contra Affair in 1986, President Reagan was already being portrayed as not knowing
what was occurring within his won Administration.

As such Ronald Reagan too an active

role with counter-terrorism actions and policies, while still maintaining the greater power
that was given to the F.B.I., C.I.A., S.S., et cetera. Reagan had finally completed the
implementation and the changes that had been labeled out within the Long Commission's
25

report that had been created as a way to combat terrorism based on their findings from the
1983 Beirut bombing"

Counter-Terrorism Policy, 1990-2000

After the end of the Reagan administration came the administration of President
George H. W. Bus. During President Bush's administration came the conclusion ofthe
Cold War. With the conclusion of the Cold War also came the fall of state-sponsored
terrorism. During the Cold War this type of terrorism was based on the premise that the
Soviet Union and the United States sponsored terrorists and terrorist activity all for the
idea of not letting either side of the polarized world advance past the other. Though statesponsored terrorist has persisted since the end ofthe Cold War, the major form of
terrorism during the height of the Cold war was state-sponsored terrorism and as such the
endofThe

Cold War marked, for a few years at least, the decline in terrorist attacks

against the United States.

At the conclusion of the Cold War, so to came the conclusion of the Cold War
mentality. President H. W. Bush's administration soon became the grounds for a
reduction in spending on the military, weapons, covert actions, et cetera. All the items
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that had helped the United States during the Cold War were deemed as to not be needed
within the post-war era, at least in the large quantities that had persisted in the Cold War.
At the same time the majority of the items that had helped the United States in the Cold
War, had also helped the United States combat terrorism. As such this evidence can be
used as that the United States didn't perceive terrorism to be a large threat to them, and
that major terrorist incidents were not being conducted against the United States.
It wasn't until the presidency of Bill Clinton that a resurgence of terrorist attacks
against the United States where conducted, and as such counter-terrorism measure became
a major priority again. On February 26, 1993-thirty-six

days after Clinton took office,

terrorists who the CIA would later reveal were working under the direction of Osama bin
Laden detonated a timed car bomb in the parking garage below Tower One of the World
Trade Center in New York City. Clinton responded by ordering his National Security
Council, under the direction of Anthony Lake, and the FBI to find and punish those
responsible. In his 1995 State of the Union address, Clinton proposed "comprehensive
legislation to strengthen our hand in combating terrorists, whether they strike at home or
abroad.,,25 He sent legislation to Congress to extend federal criminal jurisdiction, make it
easier to deport terrorists, and act against terrorist fund-raising. In June 1995, Clinton
issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which stated that the United States "should
deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our
citizens." Furthermore, it called terrorism both a "matter of national security" and a crime.
25President Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the
Union," January 24, 1995.
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In 1998, Clinton appointed Richard Clarke-who
terrorism division of the CIA-to

until then served in a drugs and counter-

lead an interagency comprehensive counter-terrorism

operation, the Counter-terrorism Security Group (CSG). The goal of the CSG was to
"detect, deter, and defend against" terrorist attacks. Additionally, Clinton appointed
Clarke to sit on the cabinet-level Principals Committee when it met on terrorism issues. In
the final years of Clinton's presidency the CSG drafted a comprehensive policy paper
entitled "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status
and Prospects." The paper outlined a method to "roll back" al Qaeda over "a period of
three to five years."

26

As the new threat of terrorism faced the United States with the deaths of its
citizens, the president, Bill Clinton, responded in kind. (See Table 3, on next page, for
U.S. Citizens Casualties) Following along the same lines that Ronald Reagan had, as
suggested in the Long Commission, Bill Clinton adopted a proactive policy. Clinton used
existing legal avenues, as well as the implementation of creating new avenues to combat
terrorism. President Clinton used the F.B.I. to investigate terrorist attacks, such as the
embassy bombings in 1998. As such instead of using military measures, Clinton
associated terrorism as a crime and so he used governmental agency that specializes in
criminal investigations.

Also when Clinton used his State of the Union Address, he

publicized the need to combat terrorism. Finally, the creation of the Counter-Terrorism
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"US

Security Group outlined the capabilities of using all of the available resources at the
disposal of the United States to combat terrorism, and that the use of a proactive policy
was a better choice of action compared to the previous policy of reaction to incidents and
responding in kind with military force.

Wounded

Year

Dead

1993

7

1,004

1994

6

5

1995

10

60

1996

25

510

1997

6

21

1998

12

11

Total

66

10,611

Table 3. Total US Citizen Casualties Cause by International Attacks, 1993-98. Data
retrieved from U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998.
Washington, DC: April 1999.
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Conclusion

In conclusion, United States policies area ever changing and ever evolving. Overall
they tend to be reactionary, specifically seen by the impact of the 1983 Beirut barracks
bombing on United States policy. Although the policy changes were not seen for many
years after the event, they did contribute to the establishment of clear and strong policy
directives. United States policies, specifically those directed at countering terrorism were
not strong and had many weaknesses prior to the 1983 Beirut bombing, and were
reactionary without the potential to effectively deter terrorist actions against the United
States except with the possibility of military force being used. Though the bombing did
not cause counter-terrorism polices to become stronger by itself, it did have a hand in the
contribution of their creation. There is very little scholarly research that has been done on
the 1983 Beirut bombing and its influence on U.S. policy, let alone research done on how
U.S. policy changes over time. With research like this accomplished there is a possibility
for scholars to note how and why specific U.S. policies have changed over the years, and
in the instance of counter-terrorism policy there is a great chance here to not the changes
and why they occurred. The greatest lesson learned through studying the impact of the
1983 Beirut bombing on U.S. foreign counter-terrorism policy is that it shows that by
pursuing ever possible measure imaginable, from intelligence gathering all the way to
diplomacy, is the best possible way of combating terrorism today. The same was true
during the administration of President Reagan and during President Clinton's tenure.
There is no finite way to combat terrorism, it has been around since Biblical times and will

30

be around for decades to come. The only effective way to combat terrorism is to pursue
every possible avenue that a government can, in hope of protecting itself and its citizens.
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Figure 2. Sketch map of the route taken by the terrorist bomber on the morning of23
October 1983. Original map produced and compiled for the Department of Defense's
report on the 1983 Beirut Bombing, and taken from said report.
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